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It was in Meiji Japan that the language of nineteenth-century Europeannationalism was first given an East Asian inflexion, and thence that Chi-nese reformers derived some of their earliest blueprints for the apparatus
of modern statehood. Among the Japanese institutions and practices that
impressed them were museums, (1) which, like their Western models, aspired
to encompass the whole range of modern knowledge – from the natural sci-
ences to geography, and from anthropology to “Art.” History, conceived as a
narrative of progress and nationalist teleology, was central to the structuring
of this encyclopaedic enterprise, and to the broader project of fostering a
sense of modern citizenship. Whereas traditional historiography addressed
itself to the moral formation of the civilised man and loyal official, the rigours
of a world of nations locked in eternal Darwinian struggle seemed to demand
a new narrative and a new morality. Confronted by “the challenges of an era
in which the quest for national strength became the primary intellectual
aim,” modernisers rallied to the 1902 call of Liang Qichao (one of many who
studied in Japan) for a “New History” that would place “the people” centre
stage, forging a cohesive sense of national identity. (2) This was to be among
the chief tasks assigned to the institutions of the modern Chinese state –
whether Nationalist (Kuomintang) or Communist.
Over the past century, other models and other ethical frameworks have
impinged on China’s museums. In the People’s Republic (PRC), for example,
Soviet precedents have left a deep institutional imprint, even while class-
based definitions of “the people” have fallen from favour. Nonetheless,
through their various ideological shifts, the regimes facing off across the
Taiwan Strait have continued to see the production and dissemination of
authoritative narratives of the national past as a crucial task of the state.
Museums of national history constitute a key public manifestation of these
authorised visions.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the immense Japanese impact on modern
China, for most of the twentieth century Japan did not feature prominently
in these official historical narratives. It is only since the 1980s that the war
with Japan has been subject to a “new remembering” within the PRC, as
historical scholarship has enjoyed broader licence, and as political consid-
erations – the need for a new legitimating strategy, hopes for reunification
with Taiwan – have encouraged greater emphasis on the role of all China’s
people, including the Kuomintang (KMT), in a united “patriotic” struggle. (3)
“Ironically,” Parks Coble remarks, “this appeal to the Kuomintang occurred
just as the party began to lose its grip on the island.” (4) This political tran-
sition was accompanied by a “new remembering” of Taiwan’s own past as a
Japanese colony. While the KMT celebrated its own victory over Japan, lam-
basting the treachery of the Communist Party (CCP) (which fully repaid the
compliment), official accounts devoted little attention to Taiwan itself, or
to Japan’s place in its history, except to underline the essential “Chineseness”
of the island and its people. (5) With the arrival of democratisation and “lo-
calisation” (bentuhua) from the late 1980s onwards, this changed drastically.
For many repelled by the prospect of reunification, embracing Taiwan’s
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Japanese heritage became one way of asserting a “multicultural” identity
distinct from the monolithic “China” of both KMT and CCP imaginings.
This article looks at how the major national (or pseudo-national) historical
museums in China and Taiwan interpret and display these very different
“new rememberings” of Japan. The main focus is on the permanent exhibi-
tions of the modern history wing of the National Museum of China (for-
merly the Museum of the Chinese Revolution) (NMC), which finally
reopened in 2011 after almost a decade of refurbishment, and of the Na-
tional Museum of Taiwan History (NMTH), which opened in the same year.
It discusses how museum portrayals of Japan reflect the divergent public
discourse on national identity on either side of the Taiwan Strait. At the
same time, it analyses what the contrasting presentational mode of each
exhibition – the way in which images of Japan are conveyed to the visitor
– suggest about change (or the lack of it) in official conceptions of the social
and political role of the museum.
Through examining the relationship between museums and the apparatus
of the Chinese state (ROC and PRC), the first section locates the NMC and
NMTH in their bureaucratic and political contexts. The next section dis-
cusses the various forms of identity that museums have been used to con-
vey, how and why emphasis has shifted, and what this has meant for the
depiction of Japan – citing examples from other institutions and other
media, official (e.g. school textbooks) and non-official. The remainder of the
article looks in turn at the NMC and NMTH, outlining the history of each
before examining how Japan is represented in their permanent exhibitions.
It concludes by considering what can be learnt from this about the evolving
relationship between state and people, and between official historical dis-
course and the broader political context, in China and Taiwan.
Chinese and Taiwanese museums in political
context
Museums can take various forms – from imposing architectural monu-
ments to “universal” human endeavour, to embodiments of national or civic
pride, to the more modest products of communal or private initiative. They
can likewise serve a variety of functions: commemorating the philanthropic
collector or great leader, reconstructing the everyday life of our ancestors,
imparting “civilisation” to the masses, inculcating ideological “correctness”
or patriotic enthusiasm, promoting dissenting narratives, introducing the
wonders of high art or modern science, or displaying vernacular arts and
crafts. Besides their educative or recreational functions, many also serve as
important centres for conservation or research. “In contemporary museum
display,” according to one specialist, “there is an on-going conflict between
the construction of meanings that support an authorised collective memory,
frequently linked to a linear narrative of progress, and an ambition to act
as places of pluralism and inclusion.” (6)
The rapidly expanding museums scene in both mainland China and Taiwan
reflects this variety and tension – though more so in post-Martial Law Tai-
wan than in post-Tiananmen China. Lavishly-funded new projects feature
slick displays incorporating the latest technological gimmickry, even when
conventionally didactic conceptions of the museum’s role persist. In addi-
tion, a veritable fever of state-sponsored museum-building, renovation, and
expansion has been fuelled, in Taiwan as in China, by competition between
cities and regions for prestige and the increasingly significant tourist dollar
or yuan. The national historical museums examined here therefore cannot
be taken as representative even of public museums – but they do occupy a
highly symbolic position within the public cultural “space” of their respective
states.
That space itself has been largely defined by a hierarchy of public cultural
institutions. The role of museums in arousing a sense of national pride has
received particular emphasis in mainland China since the 1990s, as the lan-
guage of universal class struggle has been abandoned in favour of a more
explicitly nationalist narrative. However, underlying the ideological twists
and turns of the past 80 years or more has been a consistent emphasis –
by both KMT and CCP regimes – on the use of museums for inculcating a
homogenous and totalising sense of “Chineseness.” The iconic Western mu-
seums – such as the Louvre, the British Museum, or New York’s Metropolitan
Museum – have aspired to present a vision of universal human civilisation
(even when this simultaneously involved national aggrandisement). By con-
trast, China’s museums have reflected a retreat from the universalist claims
of traditional thought to a narrower focus on defining the nation. They have
typically asserted China’s essential difference from, and victimisation by,
the “imperialist” powers, as well as the eventually triumphant national
struggle to assert parity with the latter. (7) The Leninist origins of both KMT
and CCP, combined with deeply-rooted assumptions concerning the “ped-
agogic” relationship between rulers and ruled, (8) implied a strong focus on
enforcing ideological conformity. Museums have been subjected to close
oversight by ministries of Culture, Propaganda, or Education, and – in the
case of key national institutions – to that of senior party leaders them-
selves. (9)
Democratic Taiwan has essentially retained a cultural bureaucracy inher-
ited from the Republic of China (ROC) as constituted on the mainland dur-
ing the 1930s. “National” museums falling under the control of the Ministry
of Education include a “National Museum of History” (NMH) (not to be
confused with the NMTH) founded to promote Taiwanese appreciation of
and identification with “Chinese” civilisation. So too was the supreme sym-
bol of the ROC state’s claim to custodianship of China’s heritage, the Na-
tional Palace Museum (NPM), whose director to this day enjoys the rank of
cabinet minister. The NMTH comes under the authority of the “Council for
Cultural Affairs,” originally an organ of the “Taiwan Provincial Government”
that operated in parallel with the “national” ROC government until the late
1990s. Since the abolition of the provincial tier, the CCA answers directly
to the national cabinet, the “Executive Yuan.” Since the 1980s, Taiwan has
also witnessed a surge in the number of museums established by private
foundations or local authorities, most of them – notably the Shun Ye Mu-
seum of Taiwan Aborigines and the Shisanhang Museum near Taipei – de-
voted to the conservation and display of distinctively Taiwanese artefacts. (10)
The PRC has also maintained the national/provincial hierarchy established
during the Republican period, with “national” museums (e.g. the NPM and
NMC) answering to the central government, and provincial museums oc-
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cupying a lower tier in the hierarchy. In the PRC, as in the ROC of the 1920s-
1940s, it remains the case that “the universe of the provincial museum is
the nation”; (11) the provincial museum’s principal mission is to show how
local history and archaeology conform to a teleological narrative of the uni-
fication and assimilation of the Chinese race-nation (Zhonghua minzu). (12)
The propaganda organs of state and party closely supervise all exhibitions
for ideological correctness, and since the early 1990s museums have played
an important role in the “patriotic education campaign” launched after the
suppression of the 1989 Student Movement. As in the former Soviet Union,
particular ministries also have their own museums: thus the Defence Min-
istry controls the “Military Museum of the Chinese People’s Revolution,”
while the “China Space Museum” falls under the authority of the China Na-
tional Space Administration. “Memorial halls” and former residences of var-
ious famous figures also constitute a significant category of museums in
the PRC, as they did in the former USSR. (13) Lastly, China has in recent years
witnessed the establishment of a small number of private museums – but
these cannot survive without the constant and assiduous cultivation of
“connections” with local officialdom, compelling them, in essential respects,
to toe the orthodox historical line.
Public museums in both the ROC and PRC thus mediate official discourses
on national history and identity – but what is the nature of these discourses,
how have they changed in recent years, and how consistent or coherent are
they? Although space does not permit an exhaustive discussion, it will be
useful to outline some of the key ways in which identity is conceptualised,
and how these relate to portrayals of the historical relationship between
Japan and China.
Biology or race has been a key category of identity for modern Chinese
nationalists, melding a deeply-embedded familistic concern with blood lines
with the pseudo-science of Darwinian racialism. Biological conceptions of
Chinese nationhood took root in the early twentieth century and Republican
periods, when the National Central Museum “embraced ethnology (with a
particular emphasis on the study of border peoples) and biological evolution
with the aim of demonstrating that human life originated in China.” (14)
Race-based notions of identity have been reflected in the practice – com-
mon to the ROC and PRC – of beginning textbook narratives of Chinese his-
tory with discussions of Peking Man. The museum at Zhoukoudian, just
outside Beijing, commemorating the discovery of Peking Man, stresses the
common racial origins of all East Asians, while also recording how looting
by Japanese troops during the War of Resistance led to the loss of the most
complete set of Peking Man remains. Thus biology invokes a common East
Asian heritage, while also reminding Chinese of how that shared legacy has
been despoiled by Japan – the black sheep of the “Mongoloid” family. Mean-
while, on Taiwan, a recent trend towards emphasising the intermingling, over
several centuries, of the island’s Chinese immigrant population with Aus-
tronesian indigenes has been related to attempts to establish a biological
case for Taiwanese nationhood, asserting a genetic divide with the putative
“motherland” across the water.
Cultural notions of identity likewise serve both to unite and divide. Official
encouragement within the PRC of the growing fashion for Confucianism is
attested by recent changes to the school curriculum, (15) the naming of the
“institutes” established to promote China’s language and culture interna-
tionally, and the erection of numerous statues of Confucius – including one
outside the NMC in Beijing. In his hometown of Qufu, the Confucius Re-
search Institute (established in the early 2000s) celebrates the characteristic
“Confucian” virtues, including filial piety and an emphasis on societal “har-
mony,” while highlighting the East Asian scope of a Confucian cultural
sphere. However, this vogue for the sage’s teachings, invoking notions of
cultural identity long promoted by the KMT on Taiwan, has been controver-
sial within the PRC – with both liberals and leftists objecting to a philosophy
associated with such “pre-liberation” practices as discrimination against
women and class oppression. Moreover, on Taiwan, the singular association
of cultural identity with a conservative, traditionalist notion of Chineseness
has increasingly been challenged. In Tainan, the southern city also home to
the NMTH, the National Museum of Taiwan Literature (established in 2003),
housed in a renovated Japanese colonial building, emphasises the diverse
roots of modern Taiwan’s literary heritage. Here as elsewhere, tracing the
Japanese provenance of certain ingredients helps to dilute the “Chinese”
flavour of Taiwan’s cultural recipe.
Symbols of national identity – iconic monuments or heroic individuals –
can also embody complex and contradictory messages. Thus the Ming loy-
alist Zheng Chenggong, autonomous ruler of Taiwan in the mid-seventeenth
century, has been celebrated by both KMT and CCP regimes as a “national
hero” (for expelling Dutch colonialists), but also hailed by separatists as a
symbol of Taiwanese “multiculturalism” (his mother was Japanese). (16) The
Great Wall, built with the aim of keeping the Mongol hordes out of China
Proper, has been reinterpreted in museums (for example at Badaling near
Beijing) and in orthodox PRC historiography as a symbol of the “multicul-
tural” origins of the Chinese nation, while the greatest of the Mongol in-
vaders, Genghis Khan himself, has been recast as a Chinese national hero.
Efforts to appropriate the Chinggisid conquests as part of China’s glorious
heritage would appear to encompass Yuan Dynasty Emperor Khubilai Khan’s
(failed) attempts to invade Japan in 1274 and 1281 – though this implica-
tion is entertained nowhere in museums or official historical texts.
If culture, biology, and myth supply visions of identity in which Japan oc-
cupies an ambivalent position, so does the history of the modern nation-
building project itself. Japan provided early templates for the establishment
of institutions (including schools, universities, and museums) tasked with
socialising the masses as citizens of a modern nation. In addition, Japanese
colonial rule in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria was strongly “developmental-
ist” in that it sought not only to extract resources and dominate local mar-
kets, but also to integrate these territories – their agriculture, industry, and
commerce, as well as their culture, language, and administration – with the
imperial metropolis. (17) Hence the post-war industrialisation of China’s
North East built upon foundations bequeathed by Japanese industrialists
and administrators (including Kishi Nobusuke, the grandfather of Japan’s
current Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo). Memories of invasion and oppression,
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and the political imperative of insisting on the autochthonous origins of
modernisation, have fuelled reluctance to acknowledge any constructive di-
mension to Japan’s impact on national development. The post-Tiananmen
CCP, like the KMT under the two Chiangs, has presented China’s modern
history as a long struggle against foreign oppression, even if the identity of
the chief oppressors has shifted with contemporary political exigency. In
post-Martial Law Taiwan, by contrast, open controversy over how to evalu-
ate the contributions of Qing, Japanese, and Chinese Nationalist rulers to
local development has reflected contemporary argument over the island’s
identity and destiny.
Finally, a dimension of identity with particular relevance to portrayals and
perceptions of Japan is that of national victimhood. As Paul Cohen demon-
strates, stories dwelling on the experience of humiliation were amongst
those most avidly reproduced, read, and performed in twentieth-century
China. (18) In addition, a national self-image of aggrieved innocence is as-
sisted by the occlusion of past instances in which the jackboot of oppression
clad the Chinese foot. In mainland China since the 1980s, and especially
since the post-Tiananmen launching of the Patriotic Education Campaign,
monuments to Japanese iniquity have sprouted across the landscape; (19)
the fate of ethnic minorities subjected to Chinese rule, and the victims of
Mao’s disastrous campaigns, meanwhile go un-commemorated. But in Tai-
wan, too, a concern to underline the victimhood of ethnically Han Taiwanese
has often obscured the role of their ancestors in displacing the indigenous
inhabitants. (20) While, since the early 1990s, more and more museums have
celebrated the cultures of indigenous Polynesian tribes, few have devoted
much attention to the fraught history of interaction between the latter and
Chinese settlers who colonised the island from the seventeenth century. (21)
Contemporary Taiwanese and Chinese identity discourse, as reflected in
museums, thus exhibits many similarities – unsurprisingly, in view of the
profound linguistic and cultural commonalities shared across the divide.
However, while both sides draw on a common stock of concepts and refer-
ents, these have come to be deployed to very different effect. This will be-
come apparent in the analysis of the NMC and NMTH permanent
exhibitions. These represent the most recent and ambitious officially-spon-
sored efforts to enshrine a public narrative of the modern history of, respec-
tively, China and Taiwan. As such, both represent the outcome of attempts,
spanning two decades, to redefine the relationship between state and na-
tion in the aftermath of wrenching political and social transformation. The
very different nature of that transformation in each case is in turn reflected
in the status of the museum exhibition itself – in the extent to which it em-
bodies an evolving consensus regarding the collective past, or seeks to im-
pose a new ideological orthodoxy on “the masses.” Given Japan’s centrality
to debates over recent history on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, its por-
trayal offers an excellent window onto this process.
Japan in the National Museum of China
The NMC is an amalgamation of the two museums that previously shared
the building flanking the eastern side of Tiananmen Square: the Museum of
the Chinese Revolution (MCR) and the Museum of Chinese History. (22) The
focus here is on the “modern” section of the museum, based on the former
MCR and occupying the same (north) wing of the building. The purpose of
the MCR has been described as “to legitimize the CCP’s rule by carefully
recreating, through exhibitions, a desirable image of the Party with which
to impress the public, and to highlight the pivotal role played by Mao Ze-
dong (1893-1976) in guiding the Party to its final victory.” (23) A leading fig-
ure in the creation of the MCR, the Communist intellectual Wang Yeqiu,
sought to differentiate it from museums founded by “foreign imperialists”
(for example in treaty ports such as Shanghai), or the “antique display cases”
established by Chinese themselves (perhaps having in mind the nearby Na-
tional Palace Museum). Travelling to the USSR in 1950, he visited the Na-
tional Museum of the Revolution, noting the prominence given to Lenin and
Stalin, and the periodisation of revolutionary history into four stages, the
last dealing with the construction of socialism. He enthusiastically endorsed
the way that Soviet museums were “inextricably linked with the people,
serving as their classroom” (24) – echoing Jacques-Louis David’s vision of the
Louvre as an “imposing school.” (25) Among the aspects of the MCR that
most closely followed Soviet precedent (in turn influenced by the work of
David (26)) was the commissioning of grand paintings celebrating the
achievements of the Revolution and of heroic individuals. As we shall see,
these continue to feature prominently in the NMC’s modern history exhi-
bition.
The MCR exhibition was organised on the basis of the periodisation of
modern Chinese history proposed in Mao Zedong’s 1940 essay, On New
Democracy. (27) Originally, it was to have consisted of three main sections:
the “Old Democratic Revolution” (1840-1919), beginning with the Opium
War; the “New Democratic Revolution” (1919-1949), taking the story from
the May 4th Movement and founding of the CCP to the eventual Communist
triumph in 1949; and finally a section on the post-1949 “socialist Period”
itself. However, the latter section was ultimately dropped from the plans,
so that when the museum opened in 1961, its historical narrative ended in
1949. Hung explains that the CCP Central Committee (senior members of
which, including Premier Zhou Enlai, closely scrutinised the project) took
the view that the section on the “New Democratic Revolution” was “diffi-
cult” enough – for ideological reasons, and because many of the actors were
still living; portraying events post-1949 would have led museum staff into
a veritable political minefield. (28) Indeed, it was not until its twenty-first-
century refurbishment that substantial coverage of the post-1949 period
was finally added – many of the principal actors having by then long been
safely consigned to their graves.
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Refurbishment began in 2003, with reopening originally scheduled for
2007, in time for the Beijing Olympics, but delayed due to debates over the
choice of design for the permanent exhibition and changes in museum lead-
ership. (29) Along with the Great Hall of the People that faces it, the NMC
building was originally designed to flank a huge space for mass rallies, them-
selves signifying the “revolutionary” character of the Communist regime.
The creation of a merged NMC, with the dropping of the word “revolution”
from the museum’s title, coincided with a remodelling of Tiananmen Square
itself. Since 1989, mass gatherings on the square have become extremely
rare, (30) and new structures have been erected, celebrating the achievements
of the regime while also breaking up the space and making it easier to po-
lice. Huge walls, adorned with digital screens displaying slogans and propa-
ganda videos, now bisect the square along its East-West axis. Meanwhile,
in front of the NMC itself just prior to its reopening, a statue of Confucius
was unveiled – prompting uproar amongst those who objected to the sage’s
association with “feudal” thought, or to the hypocrisy of seeking to associate
the CCP with a figure whose vilification during the Maoist era had yet to be
officially renounced. (31) The statue was subsequently relocated to a less
prominent spot within the museum precincts, but its erection nonetheless
constituted further evidence of a desire to associate the museum, and the
space surrounding it, with symbols of the regime’s custodianship of China’s
heritage, rather than with any transformative revolutionary vision.
The renunciation of “revolution” is evident from the very outset in the
NMC’s new modern history section, rechristened “the road to rejuvenation”
(fuxing zhi lu). In place of the huge bust of Chairman Mao that had originally
graced the entrance hall of the MCR, (32) visitors are greeted by murals cel-
ebrating China’s technological prowess and global status. Rather than con-
stituting a drastic break with the past, the nation’s modern history is thus
represented as a quest to restore the glories of an ancient civilisation (on
display in the NMC’s southern wing) and to recover its rightful place in the
world. Although occasional references are made to the struggle of “the
masses” against the “feudal ruling classes,” popular uprisings such as the
Taiping Rebellion or the Boxer Rising feature only fleetingly – a significant
contrast with the old MCR. Rather than being structured around the two
“revolutionary” periods (“Old Democratic” and “New Democratic”), the new
exhibition takes as its main theme the struggle of the Chinese people (in-
cluding “feudal” and “bourgeois” elements) against foreign depredation, and
their efforts, especially under Communist leadership, to build a strong, mod-
ern nation.
Part One of the exhibition, entitled “China is reduced to a semi-colonial
and semi-feudal condition,” deals with the “imperialist” onslaught of the
nineteenth century. Imperialism is portrayed as an originally European phe-
nomenon, and prominence is accorded to the iniquities of the opium trade
and the associated war – commemorated in a new diorama depicting Chi-
nese troops valiantly fending off the British. Sufferings inflicted by the im-
perialists – ranging from discrimination in the treaty ports to exploitative
and degrading working conditions in foreign-owned industries – are de-
picted in numerous old photos, as well as a newly-commissioned statue en-
titled “The Chinese people mired in misery” (Ku nan de Zhongguo
renmin). (33) The idea that domestic factors may have contributed to this
“misery” is hardly entertained. On the other hand, Japan’s role in inflicting
suffering is highlighted with the addition of a large new oil painting depict-
ing an incident during the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, the “Lushun Mas-
sacre”: beneath the rising sun flag, Japanese soldiers are shown brutally
hacking down Chinese civilians; a corpse with severed head lies in the fore-
ground, while at the centre of the painting an elderly woman, a mother, and
a small child cower at the point of a bayonet. (34) The style – very much in
the Soviet-inflected tradition of revolutionary art – is identical to that of a
1961 painting showing the “Sino-Japanese battle of the Yellow Sea.” (35)
However, whereas the latter depicts two modern warships firing at each
other, with human figures barely visible, in the 2009 work the villainy of the
Japanese figures and the suffering of their defenceless Chinese victims is
very much to the fore.
Having emphasised the nation’s dire plight in the opening section, “Part
Two” depicts Chinese people “Looking for a way to save the nation.” Facing
continuing foreign oppression, as well as popular discontent (the Taiping Re-
bellion is briefly covered), the country’s “feudal rulers” are portrayed as mak-
ing belated and inadequate attempts at reform – notably in the “Late Qing
Reforms” of the first decade of the twentieth century. (36) This period featured
massive policy borrowing from Japan, but although one picture shows offi-
cials being sent on a study tour to America, the Japanese influence on re-
formist thinking is not acknowledged. (37) A panel reproducing the founding
declaration of the Tongmenghui (a revolutionary society established by Sun
Yat-sen) notes that this event took place in Japan, but the broader influence
of Japanese thought and practice, and the country’s status as a haven for
Chinese reformists and radicals, are not discussed. Significant space is de-
voted to accounts of heroic efforts to overthrow the “feudal” imperial
regime, culminating in the 1911 Revolution – but this is represented as a
failed “bourgeois” enterprise that “did not change the nature of Chinese so-
ciety.” In cataloguing the failures of the post-1911 regime, Japan once more
enters the frame – as the author of the notorious “Twenty-one demands”
of 1915 that sought the cession of large chunks of Chinese territory and
sovereignty. (38) Although full implementation of this agreement was blocked
by the Western powers, the exhibition highlights how the decision at Ver-
sailles in 1919 to transfer to Japan Germany’s privileges in Shandong sparked
off the May 4th Movement. This in turn formed the backdrop to the “earth-
shattering event” of the CCP’s foundation.
Like the old MCR, the modern history wing of the NMC takes as its fun-
damental mission the highlighting of the essential role of the CCP in achiev-
ing national salvation. “Part Three” thus aims to demonstrate the Party’s
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29. Senior party leaders have historically taken a close interest in the presentation of history in the
NMC/MCR, though details are hard to pin down. Chang-tai Hung notes that, as of 2005, the
archives of the museum “remain closed to outsiders,” (Chang-tai Hung, “The Red Line,” art. cit.,
p. 929).
30. And invariably carefully drilled and stage-managed.
31. See “Controversial Confucius statue vanishes from Tiananmen,” www.reuters.com/
article/2011/04/22/us-china-conficius-idUSTRE73L0Y420110422 (accessed 26 March 2013).
32. This was how the exhibition opened in the 1960s, according to Chang-tai Hung (Chang-tai Hung,
“The Red Line,” art. cit.), but – if the present author’s memory serves – the bust of Mao no longer
greeted visitors to the MCR in the 1990s.
33. By Li Xiangqun, 2009.
34. “The Lushun Massacre,” by Li Wu and Li Fulai, 2009.
35. Wu Shuyang, 1961.
36. Here some of the old Marxist terminology is deployed in section titles: for example, with references
to “the Landlord Class,” and “the Capitalist Reformists” – but the theme of class struggle is oth-
erwise largely ignored in the actual exhibition text. The term “feudal” is frequently deployed, but
is nowhere defined.
37. Liang Qichao features in this section, with panels quoting from his works – but the influence of
Japan on his educational and constitutional thought is ignored.
38. Controversy has recently arisen regarding Sun Yat-sen’s relationship with Japan, since there is ev-
idence that he may have been willing to accept the 21 demands in return for Japanese support
for his efforts to overthrow Yuan Shikai. See Yang Kuisong, “Was Sun Yat-sen patriotic or not?”,
(Sun Zhongshan daodi ai bu ai guo?), Dongfang lishi pinglun, 15 July 2013, http://history.sina
.com.cn/his/bk/2013-07-15/164950399.shtml (accessed on July 30 2013). Sun’s very close ties
to Japan are nowhere acknowledged or discussed in this exhibition.
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assumption of “the historic burden of making the country independent and
liberating its people.” In common with other Chinese museums (and school
textbooks) since the 1990s, the narrative takes a more indulgent view of the
efforts by “other strata of Chinese society” to “put forward ideas for how to
save the nation” – but insists these “were not a solution to China’s funda-
mental problems.” Chiang Kai-shek and “KMT Rightists” (though not the KMT
as a whole) are condemned for “betraying the revolution,” but the question
of precisely which “fundamental problems” they and “other strata” failed to
tackle is not clearly addressed. (39) Considerable space is devoted to displaying
photographs and artefacts related to the CCP’s struggles of the late 1920s
and early 1930s, the Long March of 1934-36, and the establishment of the
CCP base in Yan’an. However, while photographs and potted biographies of
various key leaders and foreign supporters are provided, there is no discussion
of the radically egalitarian social policies piloted in Yan’an, or of the ideolog-
ical controversies that punctuated the CCP’s sojourn there. The existence, let
alone the identity, of domestic “class enemies” is barely mentioned in this
account; instead, the story of the CCP’s survival serves merely as a prelude
to the climactic struggle against an external foe: Japan.
The old MCR devoted its hall on the “War of Resistance” overwhelmingly
to coverage of the CCP contribution (and that of Chairman Mao in partic-
ular) to the war against Japan but, according to Hung, did not really highlight
the issue of Japanese aggression or atrocities. The new exhibition describes
the Party as “the tower of strength in the people’s War of Resistance Against
Japanese Aggression” (quan minzu kangzhan de zhongliu dizhu), and likewise
devotes the most space to photographs and artefacts relating to the CCP
struggle (including many images of Mao). However, the section on the War
begins with an assertion that, following World War One, Japan “intensified
efforts to implement the policy of invading China” (implying that this was
already confirmed Japanese policy). A photograph is shown of Prime Minis-
ter Tanaka Giichi convening the Far Eastern Conference in 1927, but no men-
tion is made of the controversy amongst historians concerning the veracity
of the “Tanaka Memorial” in which this invasion policy was supposedly en-
shrined. The photograph immediately below shows the Mukden (Shenyang)
incident of 18 September 1931, thus reinforcing the impression that the in-
vasion of Manchuria, and later of China as a whole, was the outcome of a
coolly calculated Japanese plot. No information concerning domestic de-
velopments in Japan during the 1920s and 1930s is supplied, and the dis-
tinction traditionally drawn in CCP propaganda between a militarist ruling
clique and the put-upon Japanese “masses” is absent. Grisly photographs of
atrocities in Nanjing (giving a figure of 300,000 killed) and elsewhere appear
calculated to arouse righteous indignation against Japanese barbarism.
Patriotic anti-Japanese sentiment is represented in three new artworks
commissioned for this section of the exhibition. Dominating the space is a
socialist-realist sculpture entitled “Flesh and Blood Great Wall” (Xue rou
chang cheng). (40) This shows grimly-determined figures emerging out of solid
rock, the ensemble topped by a monumental male figure, arms raised, ush-
ering his compatriots to advance on the unseen Japanese enemy. Adjacent
to this is a new painting, “Cut the Devil’s Head with a Broadsword” (Da dao
xiang guizimen de tou shang gequ). (41) What is also notable about this paint-
ing is that the heroic Chinese figures are soldiers in the Kuomintang army,
carrying into battle the KMT flag. While the NMC does not go as far as some
other recently-established or renovated museums in rehabilitating the KMT
and Chiang Kai-shek, (42) these additions to the display serve to underline the
unified nature of Chinese resistance. Similarly, a 2003 painting entitled “9
a.m., 9 September 1945” (Gongyuan yiqian jiubai sishiwu nian jiu yue jiu ri
jiu shi) shows Japanese generals bowing in submission as they present the
surrender document to impassive Chinese representatives before an audience
of Chinese people and soldiers, in a monumental hall decked with the flags
of the Allied powers (China once again represented by the KMT flag). This
painting, displayed above cases of captured Japanese weapons, shows Chi-
nese greeting their victory with calm dignity. Moreover, the victory is repre-
sented very much as a Chinese achievement, notwithstanding passing
references in the exhibition to the involvement of other Allied powers, and
to the American bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
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39. A painting by Yin Rongsheng, dated 1975 (i.e. during the Cultural Revolution), shows happy peas-
ants “Burning Land Deeds,” but the significance of this act and its relationship to the theme of
“class struggle” is not discussed.
40. Ye Yushan, 2009. The title is a quotation from the Chinese national anthem. A similar bronze relief,
with the same title, graces the atrium of the War of Resistance Memorial Hall at Lugouqiao outside
Beijing. (I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for providing the latter information).
41. Yan Yang and Li Fulai, 2009. The use of the term guizi (“devil” or “demon”) to refer to Japanese
soldiers is common in the Chinese media and in school texts, although at odds with the CCP’s
supposed insistence on distinguishing between Japan’s malevolent wartime leadership and the
ordinary soldier or civilian.
42. Notable examples are the Zongtongfu, or former presidential palace, in Nanjing, which was opened
as a museum in 2004, and Chiang’s former residence in Xikou, Fenghua County, Zhejiang.
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Photo 1 – Detail from “Cut the Devil’s Head with a Broad-
sword” by Yan Yang and Li Fulai (2009). (Photograph by the author)
Photo 2 – The installation “Flesh and Blood Great Wall” by 
Ye Yunshan (2009), in the NMC gallery. (Photograph by the author)
In his study of China’s “new remembering” of the war with Japan, Coble
notes the generally “impersonal” nature of officially-sanctioned accounts,
and their tendency to treat the conflict as a “numbers game” rather than
focusing on the day-to-day experience of the population under Japanese
rule. (43) This approach is evident here, for example in a numerical summary
of the achievements of the CCP-led guerrilla struggle “behind enemy lines”
(di hou zhan chang). Visitors are told that more than 17 million “enemies”
were “annihilated” (jian), of whom more than 5 million were “Japanese sol-
diers.” We are not informed of the identity of the remaining 12 million, but
presumably many were individuals or communities identified as collabora-
tors with the Japanese and/or opponents of the CCP. The exhibition is en-
tirely silent on the issue of collaboration – discussion of which might invite
doubt over the actual extent of Chinese unity or resolution in defying the
Japanese aggressors. (44)
The fondness for numbers is also highly selective; no casualty figures are
provided for the CCP-KMT Civil War that immediately followed victory over
Japan, let alone for the later victims of the Great Leap Forward or the Cul-
tural Revolution (which do not rate a mention). Moreover, despite the tri-
umphalist account of the CCP’s Civil War victory, the exhibition narrative is
vague regarding the deficiencies of KMT governance. Chiang and KMT offi-
cialdom are accused of corruption, repressing dissent, favouring the capi-
talist classes, and economic mismanagement leading to hyperinflation –
but few details are provided, perhaps for fear of inviting comparisons be-
tween the failings of the late-1940s KMT and those of the CCP today. More
emphasis is placed on the KMT regime’s general duplicity, especially its re-
liance on American support – without mentioning the far greater extent to
which the CCP drew on Soviet backing. The foundation of the PRC can thus
be all the more plausibly hailed as the moment at which the Chinese people
finally “stood up” and rid themselves of dependence upon, or domination
by, foreign powers. (45)
Japan hardly features in subsequent sections of the NMC exhibition, except
in passing – for example, in a photograph illustrating the normalisation of
Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. In the late 1970s (as He Yinan notes else-
where in this special issue, a particularly warm period in Sino-Japanese rela-
tions), Deng Xiaoping hailed Japan as a model for China’s reforms (46) – but
this goes unacknowledged in the new NMC. Nor is racial or cultural kinship
with Japan a discernable theme of the exhibition. Rather, Japan features as
the epitome of the foreign oppressor, an image of imperialism on steroids,
the significance of whose impact is heightened by the downplaying of the
old revolutionary narrative, with its sharper focus on domestic “class enemies.”
In his 2000 study of paintings from the MCR collection, Kirk Denton proposes
a typology encompassing images of “temporal crossings,” celebration of “the
unity of party and masses,” depictions of intellectuals as revolutionary heroes,
and “martyrs” to the revolutionary cause. (47) He also notes that several works
of the late 1970s and 1980s, in contrast to those from earlier decades, de-
picted war as a cause of tragic personal loss more than as the occasion for
glorious martyrdom; and that Japanese figures seldom feature in these or ear-
lier paintings. While paintings relating to each of Denton’s themes still feature
in the NMC, art newly commissioned for the museum’s reopening reflects
the shift of emphasis away from “revolutionary” concerns. In the new NMC
paintings, the Japanese enemy features more prominently – as the agent of
China’s humiliation, and the object of triumphant Chinese revenge.
Despite the lingering of class-based terminology (“bourgeois,” “feudal,”
etc.), the theme of class struggle is almost entirely absent from the new
NMC exhibition. In his analysis of Chinese state museums (established in
the 1980s-90s) devoted to the war with Japan, (48) Denton observes a shift
away from a conventionally Marxist narrative towards a greater emphasis
on “morally unambiguous” depictions of Japanese atrocities that serves “to
direct divisive class resentments toward an external other,” reinforcing a
sense of “national unity and shared national sentiment.” In order to highlight
“the suffering of the Chinese body” and preserve the memory of past hu-
miliation, several of these museums feature graphic dioramas and images
of Japanese brutality. “The emotionality of atrocities,” Denton notes, “is one
way the state can forge national cohesion without stressing the potentially
subversive message of revolutionary class struggle that was until very re-
cently so central to its legitimising myths.” However, alongside this newer
emphasis on victimhood, the “victor” narrative of the Maoist era still per-
sists, with its greater stress on Chinese strength and agency: on victimhood
actively and heroically transcended rather than passively borne.
While the victimhood narrative predominates in the exhibits examined
by Denton, he notes that, following its refurbishment in 2005 (the sixtieth
anniversary of the end of World War II), the Memorial Hall to the People’s
War of Resistance against Japan at Lugouqiao has taken “the Great Victory”
as its theme, downplaying atrocity and placing “a new emphasis on the war
as a key part of the larger global anti-fascist struggle.” In its former MCR
incarnation, the NMC’s modern history exhibit emphasised the ultimate
victory of people and party rather than dwelling on the theme of victim-
hood. The new exhibit highlights the extent of Japanese atrocities – but
does not deploy the sort of “horror show” dioramas on display in the Nan-
jing Massacre Memorial or the museum at Lugouqiao. This may in part be
due to the status of the NMC as the supreme embodiment of the official,
party-sanctioned view of the national past: while other mainland museums,
like their overseas counterparts, increasingly seek to entertain (which, on
one level, is what voyeuristic depictions of atrocity do), here the institution’s
instructional role is approached with greater solemnity. At the same time,
the focus on moral as well as military victory over Japan, encapsulated best
in the painting “9 a.m., 9 September 1945,” underlines the status of the
Sino-Japanese conflict as one phase – albeit a crucial one – in the tri-
umphant Communist-led project of constructing a strong, confident, mod-
ern Chinese state. With this broader theme to the fore, the NMC thus
represents Japanese aggression as a daunting obstacle defiantly swept aside,
rather than as a source of lasting national trauma awaiting the therapy of
apology and reparation.
Before moving on to examine representations of Japan in the NMTH, it
will be useful to note how Taiwanese history, and Japan’s role in it, is por-
trayed in the NMC. Occasional references to pre-1945 Taiwan come in the
context of the narrative of Japan’s sustained assault on the Chinese state
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art. cit.
44. China is, of course, far from alone amongst formerly occupied countries in terms of the sensitivities
surrounding the issue of collaboration. Tony Judt, in Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, The
Penguin Press, 2006, discusses the experience of postwar France, amongst others.
45. It is worth noting, as Parks Coble does (citing Hans Van de Ven), that “it is as right to say that the
War of Resistance unmade China as that it made China” (op. cit., p. 410) – by decimating almost
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46. See Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Rise of Modern China, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press, 2011, Chapter 10.
47. Kirk Denton, “Visual Memory and the Construction of a Revolutionary Past: Paintings from the
Museum of the Chinese Revolution,” in Modern Chinese Literature and Culture, Fall 2000, pp. 203-
235.
48. See Kirk Denton, “Heroic Resistance and Victims of Atrocity: Negotiating the Memory of Japanese
Imperialism in Chinese Museums,” art. cit.
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and people. A photograph shows aborigines (described as “minorities,” or
shaoshu minzu) resisting the initial Japanese occupation, and later another
photograph of a school classroom illustrates colonial attempts to “Japanise”
the local population. However, subsequent allusions to Taiwan imply that
such attempts were uniformly unsuccessful in diluting patriotic ardour for
the Chinese motherland. Photographs show “Taiwan compatriots” (along
with their counterparts from Hong Kong and Macau) volunteering to fight
against Japan, without mentioning that far more Taiwanese actually fought
for the imperial army than against it. (49) A pair of photographs also shows
Taiwanese celebrating their reunification with China in 1945. However, no
coverage is provided of the KMT’s governance of Taiwan (or indeed any as-
pect of the island’s internal affairs) after 1945, nor, therefore, of how or why
KMT rule contributed to provoking antipathy towards China and nostalgia
for the colonial period amongst many Taiwanese. Instead, the section deal-
ing with the 1980s recounts how “mainlanders” exiled on Taiwan took ad-
vantage of the thawing of cross-Straits relations to visit the long-lost
motherland, displaying a shirt worn by an ageing returnee with the logo
xiang jia (“longing for home”). Finally, a photograph of a recent visit to the
mainland by Lien Chan (KMT honorary chairman) gives the impression that
Taiwan is being peaceably drawn back into the motherland’s embrace.
Japan in the National Museum of Taiwan
History
It was ironically under the premiership of none other than Lien Chan that
the first officially-sponsored exhibition on Taiwan’s history was organised
in 1992. (50) At this time, the official KMT narrative of the national past was
similar in many respects to the current CCP account (as enshrined in the
NMC). Not only school textbooks, but also public monuments such as the
vast Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Central Taipei, conveyed a vision of
the KMT regime as China’s bulwark against foreign – especially Japanese –
invaders and “bandit” Communists alike, eagerly anticipating the day when
the “base for recovery of the mainland” would fulfil its function. (51)
Already by the early 1990s, the ground was shifting beneath this static official
view of Taiwan’s identity; in popular culture, academic historiography and the
democratising political scene, a “nativist” (bentuhua) discourse featuring a
more benign view of Japan was rapidly gaining ground. Meanwhile, the passing
of the “mainlander” (waishengren) elite that had governed the island since the
1940s was accompanied by a steady blurring of the waisheng/bentu divide,
as many of “mainland” heritage came increasingly to identify with Taiwan. It
was against this background of demographic, cultural, and political change that
the decision was taken in 1992 (the year of the first official exhibition on Tai-
wan’s history) to establish the NMTH. It was not until 1998 that a preparatory
committee was formed to execute this mandate, the same year witnessing
the publication of the very first junior secondary course on Taiwan – Renshi
Taiwan (Understanding Taiwan). The Renshi Taiwan textbooks, especially the
Society volume (edited by Tu Cheng-sheng, later Education Minister in the pro-
independence administration of President Chen Shui-bian), encouraged a view
of Japan’s role in the island’s past as one element, alongside China, in the fash-
ioning of a “multicultural” Taiwanese identity. (52)
1998 also witnessed the reopening, after extensive refurbishment, of the
National Taiwan Museum (NTM – not to be confused with the NMTH), Tai-
wan’s oldest museum, established by the Japanese colonial administration
in 1909. As Taiwanese scholars were increasingly inclined to point out, it
was the Japanese who had pioneered the academic study of the island’s in-
digenous cultures, and the exhibiting of their art, culture, and anthropology
within Taiwan and overseas. (53) The NTM, an imposing neoclassical edifice,
stood testament to a vision of the museum as an instrument of the state
for the “civilising” and socialising of the populace – a vision embraced both
by colonial Japan (which learnt it from the nineteenth-century West) (54)
and by Leninist party-states everywhere. While strong, centralised, bureau-
cratic control of museums was as much a feature of the KMT state as of its
mainland CCP counterpart, in the context of post-Martial Law democrati-
sation, the involvement of civil society actors in Taiwan’s museums sector
has become increasingly significant. For example, one of the first attempts
to protect and celebrate the island’s Japanese heritage was an initiative
launched in the mid-1990s by a group of local activists to conserve the
colonial-era Peitou Hot Springs resort in the suburbs of Taipei – leading to
the establishment of the Peitou Hot Springs Museum. (55) Taipei’s 228 Peace
Memorial Museum, commemorating victims of the “White Terror” during
the early period of KMT rule, was a far more politically-charged project aris-
ing out of a campaign involving the victims’ families; electoral politics meant
that not only pro-independence activists but also KMT leaders felt obliged
to accommodate their demands. In other cases, such as Tainan’s National
Museum of Taiwan Literature, the preservation of Japanese architectural her-
itage has gone hand-in-hand with moves – involving both official and non-
official actors – to institutionalise a narrative of Taiwanese nation making.
Like the Literature Museum, the NMTH is located in the south-western
city of Tainan, the island’s main urban centre prior to the twentieth century,
and a political stronghold of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP). A figure deeply involved in the establishment of both museums
is the prominent historian Wu Mi-cha, who served as deputy head of the
Council for Cultural Affairs in the first Chen Shui-bian administration (2000-
2004), and then as director of the NMTH from 2006-2008. Whereas many
within the local museum field prefer to portray the business of managing
and curating museums as a scientific enterprise conducted by coolly apo-
litical professionals, (56) Wu has openly acknowledged the political nature of
the NMTH project. Among the major models or precedents he cites are his-
torical museums in other “post-colonial” societies – especially Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Australia. He sees these societies, like Taiwan, as places where
settler populations have been “nativised” (bentuhua), coming to identify
primarily with their new homeland. In these societies (in contrast to many
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other former colonies), it is hard to see a clear end to “colonialism,” since
the colonial experience has so radically transformed local demography and
culture. Wu expresses particular admiration for the way in which the Aus-
tralian Museum attempts to address the consequences of this – through
embracing a “multicultural” vision of society encompassing indigenous peo-
ples and settler descendants of varying origins. (57)
Wu resigned as NMTH Director following the KMT election victory of
2008 – a reflection of the still politically charged nature of the public mu-
seums sector. The remit of the NMTH is certainly one with which conser-
vatives within the KMT remain deeply uncomfortable. However, abandoning
the project would have been neither financially defensible nor politically
expedient. Indeed, President Ma Ying-jeou, ever since his days as Taipei
mayor in the late 1990s, has sought to tread a middle path between Chinese
nationalism and Taiwanese nativism, recognising the seismic shift that has
occurred in the island’s political and cultural centre of gravity. By the same
token, Wu claims that the NMTH, by virtue of its publicly-funded status,
has had to eschew an overtly party-political position, presenting instead a
consensual view of the island’s past as a basis for further public discus-
sion. (58) However, avoiding controversy is especially difficult for a historical
museum focusing on Taiwan, given the insistence of many Chinese nation-
alists (of the KMT or CCP variety) that “Taiwan” is not a legitimate historical
subject in its own right. (59)
Before returning to the question of how successfully the museum achieves
this – particularly with respect to its depiction of Japan – it is important to
note how the NMTH presents history to the visitor. The NMC makes only
limited use of diorama and video, and this still serves an overtly propagan-
dist purpose. The NMTH makes far more lavish and sophisticated use of dio-
rama, aiming to provide visitors with a “realistic” walk-through “experience”
of the past, supplemented by various video and audio displays as well as
conventional textual exposition. Here it is possible to detect the influence
of precedents such as the Hong Kong Museum of History and the “Singa-
pore Story” exhibition of the Museum of Asian Civilisations. (60) The adoption
of this exhibitionary approach reflects shifts in museological circles within
Taiwan over the past 20 years, as well as the growing cosmopolitanism of
the academic community. However, it also reflects how a well-educated
population and a context of vibrant popular democracy make it harder for
museums to maintain a blatantly didactic posture. As with the NMC, the
setting of the museum is also significant; in contrast to the latter’s neoclas-
sical austerity and politically central location, the NMTH is an ultra-mod-
ernist structure on the outskirts of Tainan, surrounded by extensive
landscaped grounds. Through its architecture and surroundings, as well as
in the vision of history it explicitly conveys, it thus both celebrates the ultra-
modern nature of Taiwan’s contemporary economy and society, and sym-
bolically embeds its narrative in the island’s topography and environment. (61)
“Our land, our people: The story of Taiwan” (situ, simin, Taiwan de gushi) is
the title of the NMTH permanent exhibition, underlining a self-consciously
democratic vision; the focus here is not, as in the NMC, on heroic figures or
“great leaders.” The exhibition is very text-heavy, but eschews a stridently ide-
ological tone. This does not mean that the NMTH is, or even pretends to be,
“ideology-free”; it clearly adopts a political mission – that of providing the
historical scaffolding for a robust and inclusive sense of Taiwanese identity. It
does this through focusing primarily on the development of society rather
than on high politics, depicting the changing customs, culture, and daily lives
of the island’s diverse communities. Episodes of immigration, and of trade
with or colonisation by other societies, are highlighted, along with the plural-
ism and multiculturalism that have thus come to characterise Taiwan.
This bottom-up perspective also has the advantage, from an official stand-
point, of minimising the potential for provoking political controversy –
though there is no indication that this was a prime consideration in the de-
cision to focus on social history. However, concerns to minimise controversy,
not least with regard to coverage of the Japanese colonial period, caused
the exhibition’s designers to engage in a pre-emptive “rectification of
terms.” Thus the expressions rizhi (“Japanese rule”) or riju (“Japanese occu-
pation”) were avoided, since the choice of one or the other might have been
taken to imply recognition or otherwise of the legality of the colonial ad-
ministration. Instead, the neutral term shidai (“period”) was used in relation
to every era – not just the Riben shidai (“Japanese period”), but also those
of the Dutch, the Zheng clan, the Qing dynasty, and the KMT.
A related issue was the choice of a system of dating, since Taiwan, like
Japan (but unlike the PRC), still uses the traditional practice of dating by
reign. To have used this system would have involved taking a definite posi-
tion over which state had jurisdiction over Taiwan at any particular time,
whereas the use of the Western calendar allows this issue to be fudged; the
latter was therefore chosen.
The exhibition is divided chronologically into six periods, each with a the-
matic title: 
1. “The early residents” (zao qi de ju min)
2. “Encounter between disparate cultures” (yi wenhua xiang yu)
3. “Chinese migration to Taiwan” (Tangshan guo Taiwan)
4. “Territorial societies and plural cultures” (diyu shehui yu duoyuan 
wenhua)
5. “Transformations and the New Order” (ju bian yu xin zhixu)
6. “Towards a diverse, democratic society” (maixiang duoyuan minzhu shehui)
The section on the Japanese period occupies the central area, taking up the
largest proportion of floor space – and of pages in the exhibition cata-
logue. (62)
The first two sections of the exhibition respectively establish the diverse
but largely Polynesian/Pacific (i.e. non-Chinese) nature of Taiwan’s prehis-
toric cultures and peoples, and the plurality of the influences shaping Tai-
wanese society as it entered the historical record. Japan is described as
“coveting” Taiwan as early as the late sixteenth century – perhaps a com-
ment both on Japanese avarice and on the inherent desirability of the Ilha
Formosa. Here the exhibition features a circular diorama depicting three
groups of “foreigners” (wailaizhe) encountering the island’s indigenous peo-
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2012. Eighteen pages of the handbook are devoted to the Japanese period, while other sections
rate between eight and fourteen pages apiece.
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ples during the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries: Christian Westerners, Han
Chinese, and the Japanese. The advent of Chinese settlement is the subject
of the next two sections. “Territorial societies and plural cultures,” focusing
on the period of Qing rule (late seventeenth to late nineteenth centuries),
depicts Taiwan as a frontier society of settler communities and aboriginal
tribes bound by their respective customary and religious practices; there is
much material here on festivals and ritual. The overarching theme, as de-
scribed by Wu, (63) is “community” – underlining Taiwan’s status as a society
on the fringes of the Qing Empire, left largely to its own devices. 
In the section on the era of Japanese rule, however, the exhibition has far
more to say on issues of government and administration, reflecting a per-
ception of this as the key period for modern state formation on Taiwan. This
view is starkly at odds with the old KMT-sponsored orthodoxy; school his-
tory textbooks until the 1990s located the island’s developmental take-off
very firmly in the post-1945 period of KMT rule, with some acknowledge-
ment of late nineteenth-century Qing efforts at modernisation. (64) By con-
trast, the section of the NMTH dealing with the post-war period of KMT
rule takes as its main theme the fraught but ultimately successful struggle
to democratise Taiwanese society; in other respects – institutional, admin-
istrative, educational, industrial, and commercial – the implicit message is
that it was the Japanese legacy that made the KMT state viable.
It is for this reason that the section on the Japanese period is entitled “The
Great Transformation and the New Order” (though “Great” is omitted from
the English translation). The tone throughout is notably free of anti-Japanese
rhetoric; although the exhibition goes on to describe the (heroic but doomed)
Taiwanese resistance to the Japanese occupation, the panel discussing the
island’s “cession” explains that Japan engaged in territorial expansion so as
to “free itself of the dominance of European and American imperialism and
safeguard its national security and interests.” (65) Having established control,
the Japanese are described as governing “on the basis of modern reason and
scientific principles” (jindai lixing yu kexue yuanli). The application of reason
and science is then highlighted with respect to dealings with the “indigenes,”
whose cultures were subjected to intensive study by Japanese anthropolo-
gists (many of them associated with the museum later to become the NTM,
and with the Imperial University in Taipei). This project was conducted in tan-
dem with efforts to control and “civilise” these aboriginal tribes.
The modern technologies of control that the Japanese colonial state
brought to Taiwan are a particular focus of this section. These include “pre-
cise surveys and scientific administration” (jingmi diaocha yu kexue zhili),
notably the first thorough censuses and cadastral surveys conducted on the
island. However, the most prominent feature of the entire colonial-era ex-
hibit is a reconstruction of a local police post (paichusuo). While the baojia
(household registration) system is depicted as giving the police wide powers
to interfere in the lives of ordinary people, they are not portrayed simply as
the remorseless agents of colonial oppression; other roles listed include “pre-
vention of infectious diseases, promotion of agricultural technology, mobi-
lizing people to clean and tidy up [the local area], and organising the
collecting of taxes.” The importance of securing the collaboration of local
elites is also noted, underlining the complicity of the local population in the
colonial enterprise. Here visitors can watch a video of interviews with elderly
people recalling their experiences of life under Japanese administration, in-
cluding one with a Taiwanese former police officer. (66)
In Taiwan as in Japan itself, a principal instrument of modern state forma-
tion was schooling, which the section on “New Education and Modern Cul-
ture” describes the colonisers as using both to mobilise “human capital” and
to socialise the local population as loyal imperial subjects; the display here
features a small reconstructed classroom and contemporary textbooks. Both
at school and through their experience of modern consumerism, the island’s
inhabitants encountered a distinctively Japanese variant of modernity. The
Japan-influenced Westernisation of local lifestyles is illustrated with a mock-
up of a Taipei shopping street of the inter-war period – comprising a café, a
record shop, and a cinema. The liberating effect of this cultural transforma-
tion on women is particularly emphasised, with a diorama showing female
figures in various roles – nurse, teacher, student, office lady – now open to
them: “new era and the new woman” (xin shidai yu xin nuxing). But one of
the unintended effects of the introduction of modern education was to
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Photo 3 – Diorama of Taiwanese women in the section on
“[the] new era and the new woman.” (Photograph by the author)
Photo 4 – Diorama of a Taiwanese family bidding farewell to
a son leaving for service in the Japanese imperial army.
(Photograph by the author)
stimulate demands amongst a new educated elite for greater civil rights,
and the 1920s movement for a “Taiwan council” – prefiguring post-war calls
for democratisation – is given extensive treatment here. The exhibition thus
identifies the contribution of the Japanese period not only to the island’s
“modernisation,” but also, and especially, to engendering a specifically “Tai-
wanese” political consciousness – thus providing the foundation for the ar-
ticulation of Taiwanese identity in the post-Martial Law era.
Also pursuing the theme of modernisation, a subsection records the com-
mercialisation of the agricultural sector, as well as the development of in-
dustry and infrastructure more generally. The creation of the Sun Moon Lake
Hydro-electric Project is discussed here; the resulting lake has become a
scenic feature of the local landscape celebrated in official literature on the
Chinese mainland as well as in Taiwan. However, while in the PRC (as under
the Martial Law-era KMT) the Japanese origins of this lake are generally ob-
scured, here they are cited as one of many contributions by the former
colonisers to the island’s development.
Like all aspects of Taiwanese society, agriculture and industry are shown
as having been profoundly affected by “the time of the flames of war”
(fenghuo suiyue). The impact on ordinary people of “dig for victory” efforts
and campaigns to boost industrial production (especially in the war’s latter
stages) is illustrated here, as is the intensified drive to “Japanise” the popu-
lation – through linguistic measures, the “Japanisation” of names and the
introduction of state Shinto. In the aforementioned cinema visitors can also
view wartime Japanese propaganda films. However, while the war is de-
picted as a time of suffering for Taiwan’s people, not least due to Allied
bombing raids, even here the exhibition does not portray the Japanese as
callous oppressors. The fact that huge numbers of Taiwanese volunteered
for military service (before the introduction of conscription in 1944) is ex-
plicitly acknowledged. Unacknowledged, by contrast, is Japan’s use of foreign
slave labour in Taiwan during the latter stages of the war, or the experiences
of Taiwanese “comfort women” servicing the imperial army.
The abrupt end of Japanese rule in 1945 is not greeted here as a “libera-
tion”; Taiwan is described neither as “returning to” nor “recovered by” China.
Rather, the Japanese are simply described as “leaving” and the KMT regime
as “coming to” the island. One foreign regime departs and another arrives,
both to leave their lasting imprint on Taiwan’s cultural palimpsest.
Discussion
Wu Mi-cha claims that the NMTH represents a “consensus” view of Tai-
wan’s past that wholly satisfies neither the “Blue” conservative “pan-Chi-
nese” nationalists of the KMT, nor their “Green” pro-independence
opponents. (67) Some of the latter complain that the exhibition gives insuf-
ficient prominence to the post-war KMT “White Terror,” while unnecessarily
emphasising the Chinese origins of most of Taiwan’s people. Meanwhile,
some in the Blue camp remain unreconciled to the notion of a “national”
museum focusing on Taiwanese, as opposed to Chinese, history, while others
object to the positive (zhengmian) portrayal of Japan.
The portrayal of the Japanese and of other past foreign presences does
not harp on the theme of Taiwanese “victimhood” or suffering. This contrasts
with the narrative put forward in some other museums in Taiwan; the 228
Peace Memorial Museum, for example, certainly emphasises the victimisa-
tion of Taiwanese – though at the hands of the post-war KMT regime rather
than the Japanese. Indeed, there has been a tendency for “nativist” narratives
of the Taiwanese past to retain the essential narrative structure of conven-
tional nationalist accounts of modern Chinese history – victimhood and its
transcendence – with Taiwan substituted for “China” as the national sub-
ject. (68) However, the NMTH supplies a historical narrative that is both more
upbeat and more inclusive; besides the indigenous peoples, Chinese, Japan-
ese, Dutch, Spanish, and British have all been enticed by the delights of this
island paradise, and have all left their mark. By the same token, while “they”
may become part of “us,” none of “them” has a prior or exclusive claim; they
come and go, but the island belongs to those, of whatever origin, who re-
main. This seems to be a central message of the exhibition, reflected also
on the cover of the handbook, showing Japanese as well as Western figures
amongst a gallery of silhouettes from the museum’s dioramas.
The NMTH plainly assumes the mission of tracing the story of a distinc-
tively “Taiwanese” subject, just as the NMC presents the story of the “Chi-
nese” people, but of what does this national distinctiveness consist? In the
NMC, “the people” are implicitly represented as a homogenous, undifferen-
tiated, unchanging mass; “minorities” from Taiwan to Tibet feature as bit
players in a drama centred squarely on a culturally and biologically constant
“Han” national subject. It is this national subject in its totality of which the
CCP is portrayed as the supreme manifestation, and of whose modernisation
it becomes the triumphant champion; class struggle no longer supplies the
narrative backbone. The inhabitants of Taiwan fall definitely within the pale
of this Han-supremacist subjectivity, and indeed assume a certain eminence
by virtue of having fallen to the initial onslaught of Japanese imperialism.
The Japanese are starkly and unproblematically “other” in the NMC account,
and victimisation at their hands assumes an almost totemic status in the
narrative of national “rejuvenation”; meanwhile, any Japanese contribution
to China’s modernisation, or that of Taiwan, goes entirely unacknowledged.
In the NMTH, by contrast, Taiwan’s modern development and the very
emergence of a modern Taiwanese subjectivity are represented as crucial
legacies of Japanese rule. Moreover, that subjectivity itself, in rejecting Tai-
wan’s incorporation within a singular, homogenous conception of (Han) Chi-
nese nationhood, embraces the Japanese contribution to a cultural diversity
portrayed as the defining feature of “Taiwaneseness.”
While visitors or settlers from overseas are thus implicitly included in the
NMTH definition of “our people” (simin), the definition of “our land” (situ)
is far more circumscribed: the exhibition deals almost exclusively with
events that take place on the island of Taiwan. With respect to the portrayal
of Japan, this has two notable consequences. Firstly, it means that, while
the effects of the Second World War on Taiwan are much discussed, ques-
tions of what was done by or to Taiwanese people in other theatres of war
– China, South-East Asia, or the Pacific – are not addressed. (69) It also means
that the wartime experiences of Taiwan’s mid-century immigrants from the
Chinese mainland are hardly acknowledged, despite the profound implica-
tions that their very different memories of the Japanese were to have for
inter-communal relations on the island. The savagery of the Sino-Japanese
conflict, to the fore in Beijing’s NMC, is wholly absent from the NMTH nar-
rative, but is nonetheless part of the history and memories of many of
today’s Taiwanese. Meanwhile, intent on portraying the entire Chinese na-
tion (“Taiwan compatriots” included) welded into a “Flesh and Blood Great
Wall” to resist the Japanese invasion, the NMC ignores the fact that many
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possessing Chinese “blood” were less than wholly committed to this strug-
gle. Both the NMC and NMTH accounts thus play down the history of di-
vision and conflict within their respective societies.
In other respects, the two museums differ starkly, both in their depictions
of Japan and the Japanese, and in their underlying conceptions of their public
function. The extent to which these divergent portrayals are due to the very
different ways in which Japan affected Taiwan and the Chinese mainland dur-
ing the first half of the twentieth century should not be forgotten; the War of
Resistance was simply far more traumatic, for far more people, than Taiwan’s
experience of colonialism. Indeed, it cannot be emphasised enough that the
anti-Japanese sentiment that the NMC reflects (and arguably stokes) is not
something that the CCP has simply manufactured out of thin air for its own
nefarious purposes – the impression typically relayed by Japan’s mass media.
Any propaganda campaign, to be successful, must appeal to the lived reality
or folk memory of its target population, as the failure of the KMT’s decades-
long campaign to transform Taiwanese into ardent Chinese patriots amply
demonstrates. For this reason, the NMC narrative of modern Chinese history
should be seen not just as a crude attempt at patriotic “brainwashing,” but
also as part of the CCP’s bid for the support of a large domestic constituency
amongst whom anti-Japan messages strike a chord.
Nonetheless, even where there is a strong argument to be made for de-
picting Japan’s impact on China as constructive rather than destructive –
for example, in the context of the late Qing reforms and the Japanese in-
fluence on China’s nationalists – the NMC avoids complicating its portrayal
of Japan as unremittingly alien and hostile. This reflects the rigid and essen-
tially ethnic definition of nationhood that it implicitly espouses; at various
points not only “Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau compatriots” are depicted
as rallying to the national cause, but “overseas Chinese” as well. Ethnic mi-
norities feature little in the NMC story, while “foreign friends” of the CCP
(generally Westerners) remain definitively beyond the national pale. Neither
ethnic nor cultural kinship with Japanese “devils” is acknowledged. In this
respect, the NMTH takes almost the opposite approach, although its insis-
tent emphasis on the plural origins of Taiwan’s people and culture perhaps
acknowledges the continuing power of ancestry as an argument for identity,
in this case as a means of countering the totalising biological and cultural
determinism of the “One China” camp. (70)
Nonetheless, the image of Taiwan as an open, plural society is not simply
a manufactured one, and one need look no further than the museums sector
for evidence of this. While the NMTH portrays Taiwanese society as “mul-
ticultural,” focusing on the lives of ordinary people (relying for this purpose
largely on artefacts donated by the general public), other institutions – pub-
lic and private – promote very different messages concerning the island’s
culture and identity. Taipei’s massive Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen Me-
morials still stand as monuments to the ideology of Chinese nationalism. (71)
Meanwhile, the National Palace Museum continues to enshrine the elite
high culture of imperial China, and to embrace a vision of Taiwan and its
Chinese motherland united by this shared cultural legacy – even if the au-
dience for this consists increasingly of visitors from the mainland bussed in
on package tours. During the period of DPP rule (2000-2008), the govern-
ment attempted to promote its nativist Taiwanese vision of national identity
through these institutions too, much as the KMT had previously attempted
to impose its own orthodoxy through the state apparatus. However, the ca-
pacity of the state – whether DPP- or KMT-led – to impose a singular, nor-
mative vision of national identity through official cultural institutions has
been significantly undermined by the practice of democracy and the power
of an open media. The very fact that the NMTH opened under a KMT ad-
ministration that was simultaneously pursuing cultural detente with Beijing
is testament to the now-entrenched diversity of Taiwan’s cultural land-
scape. (72)
Museums in mainland China are by no means uniform in their coverage
of the past in general, or Sino-Japanese relations in particular; and diversity
in perspective or interpretation is nowadays more than matched by variety
in presentational mode. Nonetheless, they remain transmission belts for
party ideology – “bases for patriotic education” – devoted to the chrono-
logical narration of a drama starring an essentially unchanging subject: the
Chinese (i.e. Han) people. This is especially the case in the NMC, which re-
tains the old narrative of a messianic party delivering liberation from op-
pression, even while foreign imperialism, epitomised by Japan, has replaced
the old “feudal classes” as oppressor-in-chief. But while the NMC invokes
the themes of national humiliation and victimhood, it does so in less graphic
terms than many of the atrocity-centred museums established in the 1980s
and 1990s; instead, it stresses the transcendence of victimhood in the tri-
umphant pursuit of national liberation, unity, and modernisation.
In the NMTH, as in other Taiwanese museums, a conventional chronolog-
ical narrative is also adopted, and a clear ideological message is discernible.
However, the story here is not one of deliverance from above for a chosen
people, but of a diverse community constructing a prosperous and demo-
cratic future out of a plethora of historical ingredients – including a hefty
contribution from Japan. Whereas in the NMC “the people” are a rhetorical
abstraction, or an amorphous mass (epitomised by sculptures of anonymous
figures emerging out of a single block) to be shaped and led by the CCP, in
the NMTH they are the stars of the show, the authors of their own destiny. 
The emphasis on national humiliation and victimhood that has long char-
acterised much identity discourse in the “two Chinas” has thus been at least
partially transcended in the new NMC and NMTH. Rather than wallowing
in past suffering, both exhibits celebrate the forward thrust of history and
the promise of national progress. However, the way in which this transcen-
dence is presented, and its significance interpreted, differs hugely in each
case. The NMC celebrates victory over a barbaric foe – the Japanese – whose
barbarism underlines the moral superiority of a united Chinese nation de-
terminedly pursuing its own distinct form of modernity. The NMTH, by con-
trast, represents a history of conquest and colonisation – with the Japanese
as its most enlightened or “scientific” exponents – transcended not through
defiant resistance, but through incorporating various “others” into a self-
consciously hybrid “Taiwanese” identity. It thus displays not only a different
approach to the Japanese legacy, but a different conceptualisation of na-
tional identity itself – one that in embracing multiple antecedents puts dis-
tance between the “Taiwanese” self and a singular, monolithic “China.”
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